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Ultimate Crisis and Resurrection
Part I: Sin and Death
Hisamatsu ShinTchi
I Religious Time
These days I have been thinking of a three dimensional problem concerning 
man’s way of being. Perhaps it may best be expressed in terms of depth, width, 
and length. By depth I mean probing man as deep as the bottom of his self- 
awareness and, finally, awaking to the Formless Self.
While by form one can mean either physical or mental, what is ordinarily 
called the “self” has both these forms. Getting free from such a self and realiz­
ing the Self that is in both ways formless is what I mean when I speak of the 
problem of depth. This is of course something which cannot be easily un­
derstood by means of theoretical explanation. At this time I will not go 
beyond what I have just stated.
What I call width has some immediate connection with the Formless Self. 
For now, however, let me put aside the question of this connection and, about 
the width dimension, simply say that it is being liberated from the egoism of 
nationality or race, expanding it to the entirety of the human race, and thus 
standing on a perspective of brotherly love for all humanity, while still paying 
due respect to the particularity of all nations and races. That is the problem
* Translated from the original Japanese article included in Zen no Hombitsu to Ningen 
no Sbinri (“The Essence of Zen and the Truth of Man”), Tokyo, Sobunsha, 1969, and in 
Hisamatsu Shin’ichi Chosaku shit (Collected Writings of Hisamatsu Shin’ichi) Volume 
2, Tokyo, Riso-sha, 1972. In the translation the italicized parts except foreign words 
and the headings are those the author himself marked for emphasis in the original 
text.
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of width. Of course this comes to be the problem of the relationship between 
the whole and the individual.
Length, the direct meaning of which is chronological, of course also 
includes spatial extension as well. Length, then, means forming history on the 
basis of the other two dimensions of man’s being. Therefore, this kind of 
length comes to have a different meaning than history in the ordinary sense 
of the term, because it is length which issues from the first and the second 
perspective, depth and width. In other words—speaking from the point of 
self—the self reaches to its depths, from out of which it moves in width or 
extension. It is this kind of extension, as extensive as to cover the whole human­
kind which forms history, that I mean by length. To summarize then, length 
means living the life of history while transcending history. However, it is only when 
one is free—even while constantly forming history—not only from what has 
been formed but also even from the work of formation itself that we can speak 
of forming history while transcending history.
Religion is varied in its actual forms, but I think true religion ought to be 
something that is possessed of the above structure. Therefore, such religion is 
not a mere religion; it comes to mean history as well as religion, or religion 
as well as history. In the aspect ofits transcending history it is religion, whereas 
in its aspect of formation, it is history. In history as ordinarily understood, 
however, the aspect of transcendence is not thoroughgoing. Of course, rela­
tively one could speak of the possibilities of such an aspect, but not in the 
ultimate sense.
Religion must of necessity have the meaning of transcending history. But 
when people speak of transcendence, I think that in most cases they believe 
that religion transcends what we ordinarily call history so as to cross it trans­
versely. By crossing I mean that religious time ofa completely different order 
from historical time intersects the latter. The intersection itself is actual 
time, according to this way of thinking. This actual time is the present of 
religious time; the part before it crosses the present is the past; the part 
after the crossing is the future. Certainly I do not assert this kind of religious 
time which crosses historical time to be the true religious time. But this way 
of thinking is what people usually have in religion.
In Buddhism, for example, we see such a way of thinking. The Buddhists’ 
so-called “three lives” are never the past, present, and future of historical time.
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They are rather the time originating from somewhere completely beyond his­
tory and entering this human world of history, which, after entering, finishes 
and leaves the actual historical time. They consider this actual historical time 
to be the present life, the part before entering it the previous life, and the part 
after leaving it the coming life. In religion such a form of time is established 
ideationally, and this seems to have its own reason. It is a necessary result of 
an idea that a Buddhaland or a Pure Land cannot be sought within this actual, 
historical world of man. When people consider man’s originally being a Buddha 
on the basis of such religious time, they may naturally think of the original 
Buddhahood in the previous life. On the other hand, they naturally think of 
attaining rebirth in the Pure Land as a matter of a future life in the course of 
religious time. Therefore, in religion, apart from what we nowadays call the 
world of history, we must acknowledge this form of time to be the regular 
notion.
However, is such a form of time to be accepted as the ultimate nature of time? 
Is it not a mere postulate or a rationally deducted conclusion? One may pos­
sibly conceive of such time by analogy with the causal relationships which are 
established in historical time. Or it might be that such time was actually sepa­
rately established, and that then its relationship with historical time was 
elaborated. In any case, however, such religious time never coincides with 
historical time; and religion of this kind is isolated and is an escape from the 
actualities of life. For example if becoming a Buddha or having rebirth in the 
Pure Land is a matter of a future life, since it occurs after this actual time in 
which we live is completely terminated, that is, in the future after death, then 
to attain it would be absolutely impossible. If attainment be in the future 
after death, then the religious world cannot but be isolated from the actual 
world, and this latter will consequently be left behind by religion. This is far 
from convincing to us. Religious time ought necessarily to be what coincides 
with historical time. I do not think that religious time is established in its 
relation to historical time by crossing the latter. I rather think that historical 
time is established with religious time as its fundamental subject. In other words, 
with Formless Self, or Self without form, as its basis and fundamental subject 
historical time is established. Therefore, the length dimension, as I mentioned 
above, comes to mean a Supra-historical formation of history, a Supra-historical 
living of history.
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II The ration d’etre of Religion
As I have mentioned above, I am considering the problem of man from the 
three aspects of depth, width, and length, through which I hope to solve various 
problems. Here I should like, first of all, to consider the first, that is, the aspect 
of depth, that is, to probe deeply into man’s self-awareness. This will be seen 
to have a connection with the problem of death and sin. While I have taken a 
keen interest in religion both scientifically and practically, for me the problem 
of depth has been the problem of religion.
Since there are various kinds, or forms, of religion, it may be dogmatism to 
take up only one kind or form from among them and call it religion. On the 
other hand, to look upon all those which are called religion as religion would 
not be very convincing. Some of them appear to be far from deserving to be 
so called, often, it must be said, with some reason. One cannot affirm every­
thing that is called religion, although it is not easy to say which to deny. Ac­
cording to the positivistic approach to the history of religion or the science of 
religion, one must study as many forms of religion as possible, affirming 
them all to be religion. In such a case the problem of which religion is genuine 
and which not is not considered. However, when we concern ourselves with 
the various forms of religion, we really cannot help making judgments and 
evaluations about them. That is, one must investigate whether or not this or 
that particular form is a developed religion or a primitive one, and, going 
one step further, examine whether or not it is really religion.
Especially when one seeks to enter religion, that is, when one wishes to 
“seek the Way,” which religion one should choose should not be a matter 
of each person’s merely subjective opinion. This, the most important problem, 
is an objective one. Taking a false step in this regard will lead one into serious 
difficulties. Therefore, for those who seek religion, what true religion is should 
be a matter of greatest concern. Further, besides the problem of what religion 
one should seek, problems such as the objective value religion has for us and 
the ration d’etre of religion become very important. Those who can feel 
satisfied with their own firm, subjective belief in some religion may feel 
themselves safe. However, to seekers of the Way in modern times who are 
very critical, and who refuse to be persuaded by anything that lacks objectivity, 
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the problem, the true religion that has its own reason, is really a grave mat­
ter that can hardly be left unattended.
For me also, as one who seeks religion, if the religion were without a 
raison d’etre not merely for me as an individual but for man per se, I would not 
be able to have a firm commitment to that religion. I would readily relinquish 
it. Should one want to preserve religion and feel obliged to find out some 
reason for it, that kind of preoccupation would stand in the way, and one might 
come to defend religion without reason. This would actually mean one’s 
defending some already established particular form of religion. Looking at 
the matter from the viewpoint of a free man—who feels no need to defend 
religion—I go so far as to think that if religion has no raison d’etre at all for man 
per se, it has nothing to do with us.
Where in man does one find the “moment” whereby be needs religion? Where in 
mankind—not in a particular individual—does one find the reason that 
religion must exist? This is a very grave concern for me. Only when it is 
settled can we say that religion has a raison d’etre for any and all persons. Or 
rather we had better say that we can call religion that which has such a raison 
d’etre. If it has such a raison d’etre and hence must of necessity exist for man, 
then it can be called true religion. To tell the truth, that is a very difficult 
problem. Is there any reason at all why religion ought to exist for man? In 
other words the problem is: Where in man does one find the “moment” which 
prevents man from remaining merely man? Where is the objective reason 
for which man cannot abide at ease with merely being man? If one can find 
any such objective reason, then one will be sure that man cannot remain a 
merely ordinary man, that man cannot help going beyond that, and that at 
this point religion is established objectively and reasonably. In conclusion the 
problem will be, whether or not man can ever remain simply man.
As for ways of thinking about man, there are many, needless to say, wherein 
both man and transcending man are spoken of; but it is not clear what kind of 
man is transcended and in what manner. Inquiring into the problem of what 
man is is extremely difficult, hardly to be settled easily. However, in our present 
times, in the modern age of uneasiness in which we stand, perhaps we can say 
this: When one speaks of transition from the Middle Ages to rhe modem world, 
Theonomous men such as those of medieval faith can no longer be called 
modem men. Let me use the term “Theonomy” here to characterize the medi­
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eval type of faith which finds its ultimate shelter in the divine law. Certainly 
it is not that there is no reason for the existence of Theonomy. But in 
modem times, and in the present age which is its vanguard, man has gotten 
rid of the kind of man that lives according to such Theonomy. Man has be­
come autonomous. Even more clearly then, types of religion which precede 
Theonomous religion, such as animism and fetishism, certainly belong to the 
past, and have no raison d'etre today. Ifonecalls them religion, it is only by name; 
they cannot be living religions with their own raison d'etre. Concerning reli­
gions of the medieval type I cannot afford now to go into detail, but since mod­
ern man’s autonomous self-awareness has become central, even though such 
religions exist today they cannot truly be called present-age religion. Religions 
of the medieval type have lost their raison d'etre, and have already died out or 
are dying. Anyway, I believe that in the present age when man is awake as 
autonomous man, the medieval type religions can no longer continue to 
exist, and are going to die out. Even though medieval type religions survive 
today, this is an age when autonomous man’s self-awareness is the subject. 
In other words, the present age is the age of humanism. If one calls religions of 
the medieval type theism, the self-awareness of today’s autonomous man 
is humanism. Further, this autonomy is not narrow intellectualism; it is 
rationalism in a broader sense. Today’s man, therefore, is a rational man in the 
broad sense of the term who overcomes bondage to the senses through 
Reason. Such men of reason, we can in a sense say, are engaged today in 
forming the world.
Today is an age when the man with humanism or humanistic idealism is 
coming into control of things, and he will continue to do so in the future. 
In this regard, we can say that the fields where such humanistic activity is 
assumed are distinctly realized as science, morality, and art, and that the 
development or advancement of such fields has become the matter of concern. 
All this apparently leaves no room for the standpoint of religion, which is 
spoken of as transcending reason. Even if from the “humanistic” standpoint 
one may speak of transcending man, one speaks so not from the standpoint 
of religious faith, but from that of reason. By this I mean that that which trans­
cends man, although not yet actualized, cannot but be thought of as the 
ultimate of reason, like Idea. Here is a way of life in which, while rationally 
approving of the transcendent nature of Idea, one goes on working toward 
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its actualization. Thus, to regard as religion the way of life which is considered 
ultimate as regards the relation between actual life and its ideal—this can be 
called the standpoint of “idealistic humanism.”
From such a standpoint, however, even if one speaks of religion or faith, 
the world of such religion or faith becomes only relatively actualized, and 
will never absolutely become actual. Rather in its never absolutely becoming 
actual history is thought to be established. Do we not here find the reason 
why the present age does not find satisfaction with itself? The ideal world 
is after all never actualized, and the actual world is the one that constantly 
suffers from the tantalizing glitter of the ideal.
However, it ought to be asked here whether or not this faith or religion of 
humanism can establish itself firmly. I mean, I should like to consider whether 
or not the very hope of attaining of such an Idea, or being resigned to its 
unattainability, has any validity at all. This will also serve as criticism of 
humanism itself so that it will become criticism of the religion thatis established 
on the ground of humanism. Where can we find the reason why the stand­
point of “reason” ultimately becomes untenable?
Our problem now focuses itself upon that of the “moment” in man which 
necessarily leads him to religion. I should like to clarify this by considering it 
in relation to the problems of sin and death.
Ill The Religious Moment in Man
In religion—not primitive ones, but those established out of a highly 
developed awareness of human nature—what moment in man is regarded 
as leading him to religion? In many cases, death and sin. Christianity regards 
Original Sin as the moment in man which keeps him from remaining man, 
and which inevitably leads him to religion. Besides, since it is called “original” 
sin, it is the basic sin, and is considered to indicate something different from 
ordinary sin. Today, however, for us who attempt to understand original sin, 
the myth which attributes it to Adam and Eve is completely unacceptable. 
Therefore, such a myth cannot but be interpreted differently, perhaps, as 
a symbol. Never can it be accepted literally.
Perhaps there may still be people who accept it as it has been accepted, and 
in the Middle Ages it may have been sincerely taken literally on faith. Theirs 
is, however, pre-modern faith, which is unbelievable for modem man. For 
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modem morality, it is unthinkable in terms of individual responsibility that 
the burden of the sin thus committed by man’s ancestors should be borne even 
today by their descendants. And yet in its emphasis of sin where not only 
particular individuals but all human beings are guilty, it is considered to 
have universality.
A direct confrontation with sin is found not only in Christianity but in 
Buddhism as well, and there too it is seen as a religious “moment” in man. 
In Buddhism, among various schools, the Jodoshin (True Pure Land) school 
emphasizes contemplation upon matfs sinfulness, considering sin as an important 
religious “moment” in man. Not only in the Jodoshin school, however, but 
in Buddhism at large sin is considered to be a religious “moment” of man. 
Therefore, we can say that sin is regarded as a very important “moment” which 
leads man to religion.
Besides sin, especially in Buddhism, death is considered to be the other, 
equally important religious “moment” in man. Death, in this case, first means 
physical death. Certainly one cannot abstractly think that physical death is 
all that death means; it includes mental death. In any case, when death is said 
to be a religious moment, it is also called into question. In Christianity, death 
may not be given as much weight as sin, but it cannot be supposed to have 
been neglected.
These two, sin and death, which ordinarily are separately considered, since 
they are each spoken of as the single or the grave “moment” for religion, can 
both be said to be the inevitable for man, and to point up man’s limitation. 
In other words, when the moment for religion in man is said to be sin and death, 
this means that sin and death constitute man’s limitation, and that they are 
what man can never overcome. We ourselves face death. There is no one who 
does not die. Death is negation of life; no man or no living being can over­
come it. The same is true of sin. No man can escape or overcome it. We must 
first separately take them up to consider what each means.
The terms sin and death are taken in various ways. They have a variety of 
meanings and can never be defined in any single way. However, when one 
speaks of sin, ordinarily one is likely to think of the term in its moral sense. 
When there is some sin committed in the moral sense, it is natural to think 
about avoiding sin. From the standpoint of morality, one must take the 
direction of overcoming sin. Getting free from sin or overcoming sin can be 
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achieved only by the moral conduct necessary to overcome sin, not by any­
thing else. Sin, from a moral perspective, must always be overcome by moral 
means. However, morally speaking, one can only be negative about the 
possibility of completely overcoming sin. In other words, moral strength is 
like the limitation of idealism. Although, relatively, one can overcome each 
single sin, one can never get rid of sin itself, no matter how long one may try.
IV Sin
Ordinarily sin may be considered to belong exclusively to morality. But 
when we consider it well, we come to wonder whether we can limit sin to morality 
alone. I rather think that sin exists in science and art as well, and not just in 
morality. Certainly it is not of a moral type, but just as we have evil against 
good, we have falsity against truth, ugliness against beauty, and defilement 
against purity. Even if we could get rid of sin in a moral sense, we could not 
be free from the contrast between ugliness and beauty in the world of art, 
or opposition between falsity and truth in the world of science. Therefore, rw 
ought to be extended to include the problem of reason per se.
To summarize in a general manner, the concept of sin ought to be extended 
far enough to separate rationality from irrationality. Meanwhile, the opposi­
tion of rational and irrational is basic to the structure of reason, so that to 
remove what is irrational and to leave behind only what is rational is, one 
must say, impossible. This becomes clear when one considers the structure of 
reason itself. For this reason, getting free from sin or being redeemed from 
sin is, speaking from the standpoint of reason, impossible.
However, by this I do not mean any impossibility of removing what is ir­
rational in the process of rationalization. In the process one must promote indi­
vidual rationalization, and in this respect reason has its own life. It is not that 
difficulties met with in the process make it impossible to be liberated from sin 
in the broader sense of the term as indicated above. I mean rather that the 
impossibility of being freed from sin is indubitably based on the structure of 
reason itself.
Distinguishing the basic contradiction, dilemma, or antinomy which is consi­
dered to exist in the structure of reason from the relative contradiction, dilem­
ma, or antinomy which reveals itself in the process of rational activity, we will 
deal with the former, which is the antinomy inherent in reason itself. This 
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more basic antinomy is an ultimate one which concerns the structure of reason, 
and, as such, is the ultimate antinomy.
The antinomy in the process of rational activity cannot but be of a relative 
nature; it cannot be ultimate. Distinguished from that, the basic, ultimate 
antinomy is no other than the fatal limitation of reason. Here we see the extrem­
ity-situation of reason itself. Here we see the ultimacy of sin. In other words, 
it is here that sin is said to be the unavoidable limitation of man.
This is especially the limitation of modern man who today depends on the stand­
point of reason. Even though he has this in the depths of his own being, he 
is not aware of it himself and so continues to rely on this antinomic standpoint. Herein, 
fundamentally, lies the direction of history in modem times and also the direc­
tion of human life. It is in this light that I interpret the easy-going nature of 
human life in the modern world or in modern history'. To think that by rely­
ing on the standpoint of reason we can dissolve sin is to consider possible what 
is really impossible.
Only when sin is seen to be such as I have been explaining, does it become 
the sin of man which covers the whole field of man; and unlike ordinary trans­
gression, it comes to mean the root of all sins. In other words, sin arises because 
man has ultimate antinomy in the very structure of his being. Insofar as the 
basic antinomy is not solved, we are fated never to be redeemed from sin. In 
this sense, I feel that so-called original sin really does exist (although its myth 
is far from being convincing to us today). This original sin is that which no 
one has been able to escape since man’s beginnings—by which I mean since 
man became highly developed. To remain unaware of this would be nothing 
but religious ignorance—although ordinarily few will refer to this as religious. 
This is man's most basic kind of ignorance. If one should look for man’s darkest 
spot, perhaps this would be the place to look. Man’s fate, the deep chasm from 
which he cannot escape, the abyss of man, lies there.
Realizing this kind of sin differs from the case in which I get obsessed 
with the idea of my sinfulness because someone else tells me I am guilty. It also 
differs from the case in which one categorizes each individual transgression 
and considers it to be extremely wicked. A question from which we cannot 
escape is, what makes so-called extreme wickedness possible? When we speak of original 
sin, which aspect of man do we point to? No mere dogma or doctrine or 
words—arrogant as it might sound to speak thus—attributed either to
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Sakyamuni or Jesus Christ or anyone else, would ever convince me that I 
have committed original sin. In this very respect one might well insist that 
I have karma accumulated from previous lives or that I have the stains of 
original sin on my soul. However, I have never been ashamed or worried that 
I might have such isma-accumulation or effects of original sin. I rather think 
that because I am affected thus the real situation of man becomes apparent 
and, far from feeling penitent, I take delight in it.
It seems that ordinarily people emphasize relative guilt out of some senti­
mentality, and taking it as categorical or ultimate feel themselves to be sinful 
or ultimately guilty. The feeling of being unable to keep on living and nihilistic 
feelings, in ordinary cases, prove, upon careful examination, to be only of a re­
lative nature. Situations in which one is really and ultimately nihilistic will 
prove rarely to exist if one calmly investigates them rationally. Nowadays, 
there are said to be a great number of suicides. But there does not seem to 
be any distinct reason which may have made these suicides inevitable. Inmost 
cases relative reasons given too much emphasis seem to have brought them on.
I wonder, however, whether wc can approve of such a situation. To say on 
such grounds that man is nothing merely reflects a very shallow understanding. 
Man is said to be nothing. But where should we locate this nothingness? Today 
people often speak of nihilism, but the basis for that, in my view, is simply 
in the ultimate antinomy of man. I believe that it is in this ultimate antinomy 
that the ground for ultimate negation of man is found. I would rather speak 
of the ultimate antinomy as sin than say that sin constitutes antinomy. That 
is the way I should like to define original sin. For all the various ways of 
understanding sin, I should like to think that inevitably all of them stem from 
this ultimate antinomy.
V Death
In Buddhism it is said that man does not enter religion only because of the 
“moment” of sin. For it is said that, apart from sin, there exists the “moment” 
of death. If sin is spoken of not in its ordinary sense but according to the above 
interpretation, then our next problem is how we should think of death in a 
manner similar to our treatment of sin. I need not mention here that when one 
speaks of hating death one has hope in life, and this indicates that death is 
inseparable from life. There is no death as such alone; death, after all, is not to 
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be separated from life. It is death as the other side of life. In this sense, one must 
say that death is invariably of the nature of life-and-deatb.
From the viewpoint that death is that which has the nature of life-and-death, 
it must be said that there is no life apart from that which has the nature of 
life-and-death. Life which has the nature of life-and-death cannot possibly 
acquire a life which has the nature of life alone. In other words, for life which 
has the nature of life-and-death it may be possible to relatively overcome 
death but is ultimately impossible to do so. This is true because at the bottom 
of life there exists the antinomy of life-and-death. It is only in the case of ordi­
nary life that living or dying can become a question. According to my view, 
one should fear not death but life-and-death. Then our sharing in the nature 
of life-and-death comes to be the basic problem of our life. In other words, our 
life stands on the basis of the ultimate antinomy which is life-and-death. There­
fore, tbe meaning of death ought to be deepened to the extent that not mere death 
but life-and-death is death.
Besides, this life-and-death nature can be spoken of in relation to all living 
beings, that is, in relation to all that which is alive. In this case life-and-death 
means origination-and-extinction, which is not necessarily limited to man’s 
life-and-death.
The term origination-and-extinction is an all-inclusive one. It applies to 
man as well as to everything else. However, we must extend the content 
much further than life-and-death or origination-and-extinction, and bring it 
to the very point of existence-and-nonexistence. In other words, it comes to mean 
the life-and-death of man's life in its being-and-nonbeing or in its existence- 
and-nonexistence. Therefore, if one speaks of getting rid of death as redemption 
from mere death, he is not very exact in his way of expression. Rather it should 
be getting rid of what is of the nature of life-and-death.
Consequently as regards death, one must say that the very ultimate 
antinomy of life-and-death is death. This is what I consider to be ultimate 
death or ultimate extinction. This is what is called Great Death in Zen. Ultimate 
death, which can also be called ultimate negation, is evidently not any mental 
negation as an abstract idea; it ought necessarily to be fundamentally sub­
jective.
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VI Sin and Death as Inseparable, and Emancipation
As I have mentioned above, by sin I think we should mean the ultimate 
antinomy of the rational-irrational, which is found in the structure of reason. 
Nothing else, I should like to say, is the real, ultimate sin. As for death also, 
it is nothing but the ultimate antinomy of existence-and-nonexistence, which 
lies at the bottom of life, and which I consider to be ultimate death. That is 
how I should like to interpret sin and death; or rather, extreme though it may 
sound, I think that is the way they really are. They ought to be so; they cannot 
but be so. In Buddhism, in the case when death is said to be the “moment” 
for religion in man, if the death is to be man’s extremity-situation, it ought 
to be deepened to the kind of death I am referring to. The interpretation of 
sin also ought to be as thoroughgoing as the one which I have outlined above.
In the above I have mentioned separately the ultimate antinomy of life-and- 
death and that of the rational-irrational. This may have made them appear 
separate from and unrelated to each other. But the truth is that these two cases 
of ultimate antinomy are never two in us; in the concrete, actual man they 
are one. The ultimate antinomy of life-and-death and that of the rational- 
irrational are not separable from one another; they are indivisible. To take up 
either life-death or the rational-irrational alone, apart from the other, is 
evidently an abstract matter. In their concrete reality these two are one; there 
is never one apart from the other. To ask why the ultimate antinomy of life- 
and-death becomes pain or suffering in us is already a question based on the 
judgment of reason. Not only because one feels that pain is detestable but 
because one judges that it is to be detested, does liberation from pain come to 
be a really objective problem. Further, sin without a sinner is a mere idea; 
it is the concrete man of life-and-death who is the sinner.
Such ultimate antinomy really pressing upon us is the true “moment” of religion. 
A death or a sin which one can look upon is an abstract one, a mere object of 
thought. We are confronted by ultimate death, ultimate sin. This ultimate 
antinomy is the very self-awareness in which existence and value are one; it 
is not anything to be known objectively. It is original to man; it is at once my 
way of being and that of all human beings.
The “moment” of religion for man ultimately lies here. And any kind of 
religion should be brought home here, should be pursued to this depth. As 
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for relative religious moments in man, there may be a variety of them. It is 
only when one goes from relative moments to the ultimate moment that there 
prevails the ultimate antinomy which is fundamentally subjective. It is there 
that there obtains the true religious “moment.” This is so, I believe, whether 
we know it or not.
In Buddhism when one speaks of sin, one calls into question not only evil 
or sin but the three antinomies: good-evil, right-wrong, and pure-defiled. 
Again, since death is ultimately of life-death nature, and since liberation from 
death is liberation from life-and-death, Buddhism regards the kind of ultimate 
antinomy which I refer to as the “moment” for religion. Further, in Buddhism, 
when one speaks of the liberated state of man, liberation from origination- 
and-extinction is also called “nonorigination-nonextinction,” “No-birth-No- 
death,” “birth-and-death as one truth,” and so on. Freedom from discrimina­
tion of good-and-evil, right-and-wrong, pure-and-defiled, is called “No- 
good-No-evil,” “true-and-false as one truth,” “pure-and-defiled as non­
duality,” and so forth. Here that which has been liberated from the moment 
of ultimate death, ultimate sin, is considered to be man’s true way of being. 
As remarked by the Sixth Patriarch of Zen in China:1 “At the very time 
when you do not think of good or evil... your original face.” Through and 
through this is a case of the Not-thinking-either-of-good-or-evil. Also, in the 
expression by the Sixth Patriarch :2 tcThe face that you have before your parents 
gave you birth.” The self prior to birth from one’s parents means the Self 
without the nature of life-and-death. Such a question the Sixth Patriarch posed 
to a monk, saying, “At the very time you do not think of good or evil, please 
give back to me the Face that you had before your parents gave birth to you ” 
This constitutes the basic task of man. Without the solution to this problem 
one cannot help falling into anxiety and desperation.
1 From the Platform Sutra by Eno the Sixth Patriarch.
Taisbo Tripitaka 48, p. 349b.
2 As recorded in The Pivotal Point of Mind-Transmission Set Forth by the Zen Master Tuan-
chi of Mount Huang-po TT 48, p. 384a.
Similar expressions are found abundantly among the koan of Zen. Such a 
problem, which has become one with the person who wrestles with it is the 
“great doubting-mass” (dai-gi-dan), i.e. the self as ultimate negation. Here my
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whole body and whole mind is one as fundamental subject. Such a basic “great 
doubting-mass” is itself the ultimate antinomy. Although ordinary doubts 
are intellectual, this “great doubting-mass,” despite the intellectual term 
“doubting,” is no mere intellectual doubt. It means something total, in which 
emotional anguish and volitional dilemma, as well as intellectual doubting, 
are one fundamental subject.
In this regard, the “great doubting-mass” completely differs quantitatively and 
qualitatively from the “doubt” in Descartes’ de omnibus dubstandum (“Concerning 
the necessity of doubting everything”), which served as an important moment 
in the change from the Middle Ages to modern times. The “great doubt­
ing-mass” is all-inclusive, total, and ultimately and radically subjective. Here, 
what is being doubted is the very doubter himself, and the one who doubts is that which 
is doubted; there is no distinction between that which acts and that which is acted on, 
between subject and object. This is the one great mass of doubt to which all the doubts 
are reduced and upon which all the doubtings are based. Therefore, clearly 
enough, this is far from something like a sum total of possible particular doubts.
In Zen from very early days there has been a term “great doubt” (dai-gij. 
In my view the “great doubt” of Zen ought to be what I mean by the “great 
doubting-mass.” If the “great doubt” of Zen were to mean, as it has tended 
to be mistaken in the tradition of koan Zen heretofore, a doubt or a koan which 
concerns some particular, individual thing or matter, we must say that it 
would be unworthy of being called the great doubt. As for the well-known 
koan ofjoshu’s Mu, which is presented as the first case of the Mumonkan,3 even 
if the koan becomes, as Venerable Mumon said, “the doubting-mass (given rise 
5 H'u-nun-kuan MTIM; by Wu-men Hui-hai (Mumon Ekai 1183-1260),
first printed in 1228.
Once a monk asked Joshu (Chao-chou 778-897), “Docs a dog have the Buddha- 
nature?” Joshu said, “Mu”.
Let me, Mumon, remark upon this. For the practice of Zen we must necessarily go 
through the Patriarch’s Barrier. For attaining wondrous Awakening we need to exhaust 
our reasoning mind and have it extinguished. Insofar as the Patriarch’s Barrier is not 
penetrated, insofar as the reasoning mind is not extinguished, we will all remain no other 
than the ghosts abiding on blades of grass or attached to trees.
Now let me ask: What is the Patriarch’s Barrier? Simply it is this single Mu, the single 
barrier of our school. Therefore we call it the gatcless barrier of the Zen school. The one*
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to) with your whole being,” should it remain a particular doubting-mass, it 
could never be called “great doubting-mass.” Insofar as it is not great doubt­
ing-mass, even when it is broken through and awakening opens up, it would 
be no more than particular satori which has form*,  it could never be called Great 
Awakening or Awaking-Mass, which, Rinzai said,4 “Without any form, pene­
trates throughout the ten directions and right now is working in your pre­
sence.” Because the doubt is exhaustively thoroughgoing, totally single, and 
fundamentally subjective, the Awakening also can be exhaustively total 
and fundamentally subjective.
*who has been able to penetrate it will not only personally see [Master] Joshu, but will 
walk hand in hand with the successive patriarchs, one’s eyebrows tied together with 
theirs, seeing through the same eyes and hearing through the same ears. Isn’t it delightful 
and joyous? Why is it not necessary to go through the barrier? Using up the three hundred 
sixty joints and eighty-four thousand pores, with your whole being, give rise to the 
doubting-mass and practice this Mu. By day and by night take this up. Do not mistake 
it for voidness. Do not take it for negation as against affirmation.
It should be as if you had swallowed a hot iron ball which you cannot vomit up no 
matter how hard you try. Exhaust all the wrong knowledge and remembrances you have 
had. You will thus achieve final purity and maturity. And self-effectedly the ‘in’ and the 
‘out’ will become one single piece. You will be aware of all this by yourself just like a 
dumb person is aware of his own dream.
Then flashingly Self-awakening will open up. It will surprise heaven and will shake 
the earth. It will be as if you snatched the big sword from the hand of General Kan’u 
(Kuan Yu) and, if confronted by Buddha, you will kill the Buddha; if confronted by a 
patriarch, you will kill the patriarch. Thus on this side of birth-and-death you will acquire 
great freedom, and in all the six ways of life and four kinds of birth you will enjoy yourself 
the sportive samadhi.
Now, how would you take up this case? Summoning up all your energy and vitality, 
you take up this Mu. If you go on without a break, you will see it is very much like the 
dharma lamp, which upon being lit will immediately light. Here is a verse:
“The dog,” “the Buddha-nature”:
Total presentations of the Right Command.
With slight involvement in Yes or No,
You will lose your being and life.
4 From the Lin-chi lu Rirrzai-roku (The Record of Zen Master Lin-chi I-
hsuan: Rinzai Gigen d. 866). TT 47, p. 498a.
For the overcoming of this doubting-mass, the bottom of man ought to be 
broken through. The way of breaking through it is only this—to be awakened 
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to the True Self, the self in whom the doubting-mass is resolved. Here is a 
leap. The self in ultimate antinomy cannot become the True Self with con­
tinuity. Only when the self which is ultimately antinomic breaks up, does 
the Self of Oneness awake to itself.
Therefore, we must say that there is a leap, a discontinuity. Moreover, 
this does not mean that one is saved by someone else or that redemption comes 
from God or Buddha. The self of life-death nature breaking up and becoming 
the Self without life-and-death means that the self of life-death nature becomes 
awakened to its original Self. In this sense the Self without life-and-death 
has continuity with the self of life-death nature. In this Self-awakening, as 
between the doubter and the doubted, there is no separation between the 
awakened and what one is awakened to. While the doubting-mass breaks and 
the True Self is awakened to, the former is related to the latter in a very 
special manner as the darkness of night which is dark through and through 
is to the brightness which prevails after sunrise.
By the True Self I mean the Self that is not the ordinary self, the Self that 
has become free, in the true sense of the term, from death and sin, the Self 
that is not limited by either time or space, the Formless, egoless Self.
The leap from the ordinary self to the True Self, however, is no mere leap. 
A special method is established there. Through its application, I believe the 
theological dispute between the Swiss theologian Emil Brunner (1889-1964) 
and Karl Barth (1886-1968) also can be solved.5 The method I refer to is 
5 The Encyclopaedia Britannica (cd. 1966) Vol. 4, under the heading brunner, 
(heinrich) emil, lias this:
The close link between Brunner’s theology and that of Barth was broken early in their 
theological careers when in 1934 Brunner wrote a monograph entitled Natur und Grtade: 
Zum Gesprdch mit Karl Bartb (“Nature and Grace: a Conversation With Karl Barth”). 
Brunner held that while God’s saving revelation is known only in Jesus Christ, there is a 
revelation in the creation; this revelation is reflected in the “image of God,” which man 
bears and which is never wholly lost. This provoked a vigorous reply from Barth, who 
attacked Brunner’s view that the image of God remains formally but not materially in 
man after sin has entered. Brunner replied, insisting upon the sense of responsibility as 
the “point of contact” between sinful human nature and the divine.
... The discussion with Karl Barth was published under the title Natural Theology, 
introduction by John Baillie (1946). A critical review of this discussion is given by Baillie 
in Our Knowledge of God (1939).
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the Self-awakening in no other sense than getting awakened to the True Self. 
It is not the heteronomous-Theonomous method, which has completely gone 
beyond the limitation of autonomy. Rather, it is the method of establishing the 
Self on the basis of criticizing modem autonomy.
Besides, since this is the original way of being for us human beings, it can 
be effected no matter where, when, and for whom. Being formless itself, it 
takes every form and is free. While rationally ultimate freedom is one thing 
and ultimate freedom as fundamental subject the other, the latter, which may 
also be called the standpoint of Existence, since it has no form, is Nothingness. 
This Nothingness is no mere logical negation but the way of being of the 
Self that comes breaking out through the bottom of ultimate antinomy. This 
is fundamental subject in the sense that only from this does infinite posi­
tiveness arise. Although referred to as fundamental subject, this is not any 
particular, limited being, but Reality as the most basic, Self-awaking being, 
emancipated and redeemed.
Moreover, this being redeemed is the very way-of-being of the Self not a mere 
feeling or a state of consciousness. This Self may well be called Creator because 
God or Buddha exists not outside but inside the Self and because it is present. 
In our being this kind of Self we are all equal. It is not that in the presence of an 
external God we are equal, which would be heteronomy. We all have Buddha- 
nature; we are originally the Buddha.
“All beings are of the Buddha-nature.”6
6 From the .Virrikj Sutra (No. 374) 4-4. TT 12, p. 405b; (No. 375) p. 648b, Ct al.
7 From the Zazen-SPasan by Ilakuin Ekaku 1686-1769.
“All sentient beings originally are the Buddha.”7
In this respect human beings are all equal. This is the field of “width,” the 
standpoint of all humankind.
As I have initially mentioned, if ought to be that in the point of depth we become 
the True Self emancipated from the ultimate antinomy of sin and death, that in the 
point of width we solve various problems standing on the standpoint of brotherly love of 
humankind, and that in the point of length, i.e. history, the Self of No life-death nature 
goes on living in the midst of life-and-deatb, forming history while transcending it.
(To be continued) 
Translated by Tokiwa Gishin
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